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Barbara Flagg published her landmark article, Was Blind, But
Now I See, in 1993.' The article, later developed into a book,2 named
the common white tendency not to think about whiteness as the
"transparency phenomenon." As Flagg explained, white people have
an option, every day, not to think of themselves in racial terms. 3 "In
fact, whites appear to pursue that option so habitually that it may be a
defining characteristic of whiteness: To be white is not to think about
it.'4 Flagg identified this "tendency for whiteness to vanish from.
whites' self-perception" as a transparency approach.5
Flagg's essay, on the cutting edge of legal scholarship, contributed
to the body of work that has developed into critical white studies.
Indeed many of the authors in this symposium have contributed to
expanding the knowledge and awareness about whiteness and the
privileges associated with being white.6  Reflecting on the
development of critical white studies, Eric Arnesen says that the
influence of this scholarship has been profound, but he also faults
* Copyright C 2005 Stephanie M. Wildman, Professor of Law and Director, Center for
Social Justice and Public Service, Santa Clara University. Thank you to Margalynne
Armstrong, Richard Delgado, Barbara Flagg, Sharon Hartmann, Colleen Hudgens, Patricia
Leary, Martha Mahoney, Beverly Moran, Margaret Russell, Alan Scheflin, and Michael
Tobriner for support and commentary and to Sharon Bashan, John Lough, Jr., Priya Moore,
Sylvia Pieslak, and Ellen Platt for research assistance. Thank you to the Santa Clara University
School of Law Faculty Scholarship Support Fund for assistance in completing this project.
1. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993).
2. BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE LAW (1998).
3. Flagg, supra note 1, at 969.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The term "privilege" remains problematic, since privilege can connote a reward for an
earned achievement. White privilege is not earned. Yet academic discourse has widely adopted
the phrase "white privilege," and, increasingly, more popular circles recognize it as well. An
internet search of the phrase, conducted on April 13, 2005, yielded over 102,000 web sources,
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 245 2005
Journal of Law & Policy
critical white studies for creating a "moving target" as to the meaning
of whiteness:
7
Whiteness is, variously, a metaphor for power, a proxy for
racially distributed material benefits, a synonym for "white
supremacy," an epistemological stance defined by power, a
position of invisibility or ignorance, and a set of beliefs about
racial "Others" and oneself that can be rejected through
"treason" to a racial category.
8
Arnesen characterizes the political drift of this work as defined by
"the voluntary mass relinquishing of privilege and identity." 9 He
fears that those skeptical of the persistence of privilege regard this
prescription for change as "envisioning [that] the withering away of
whiteness requires nothing but imagination." 10
Arnesen is correct that more than imagination will be necessary
for any "withering away" of white privilege to occur. White privilege
persists. Identifying the reasons for the persistence of white privilege
is a necessary precursor to combating it. Both material conditions and
socio-cultural factors contribute to the resilience of white privilege.
WHITE PRIVILEGE
Peggy McIntosh's widely acknowledged definition of white
privilege emphasizes the benefit that privilege bestows upon the
individual holder. She explains that white privilege can be likened to
"an invisible package of unearned assets."'" The holder of this
package remains oblivious to its presence, yet can reliably depend on
its contents. McIntosh continues: "White privilege is like an invisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps,
7. Eric Amesen, Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination, 60 INT'L LAB. &
WORKING-CLASS HIST. 3 (2001) (emphasizing the impact of whiteness studies on labor
history).
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id.
11. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming
to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in LESLIE BENDER & DAAN
BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 23 (1995).
[Vol. 18:245
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guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency
gear, and blank checks. 12
The significance of white privilege, on a personal level, does not
go far enough to explain why privilege persists. The systemic nature
of white privilege beyond the individual also must be examined.
13
The Latin root of the word privilege, "privilegium," means a law
affecting an individual.14 Thus, the core meaning of privilege
encompasses both the individual beneficiary and the systemic nature
of the benefit. While privilege serves the individual holder, it is the
systemic nature of privilege, McIntosh's "invisible knapsack"
multiplied throughout the group of white people, that supplies its
societal force. Characteristics of the privileged group define the
societal norm. From "flesh-colored" bandages or crayons and "nude"
hosiery that depict fair skin'5 to standardized testing, 6 individual
members of society are judged against characteristics held by the
privileged. Furthermore, privileged group members can rely on this
privilege to avoid objecting to oppression or subordination.17 Those
with privilege can afford to look away from mistreatment that does
not affect them personally. The conflation of privilege with the
societal norm and this option to ignore oppression contribute to the
invisibility of that privilege both to its holder and to society.
18
A body of scholarship has explored the privileging dynamic."9 Yet
white privilege persists. Given this information and understanding
12. Id. McIntosh lists "special circumstances and conditions" that she did not earn but has
been made to feel entitlement for. Her African American co-workers, friends and acquaintances
cannot count on these same circumstances and conditions. See also Stephanie M. Wildman,
Reflections on Whiteness and Latinalo Critical Theory, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 307 (1997)
(listing circumstances and conditions that Latina/os cannot count on).
13. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG,
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED].
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 29.
16. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between
Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997).
17. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 16-17.
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. See MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES: RACE AND THE MYTHS OF WHITENESS (1999);
FLAGG, supra note 2; RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1997); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN
2005]
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about privilege, why does it remain so easy for white people to move
through the world and not be aware of the presence and operation of
their privilege? The transparency phenomenon that Flagg identified
certainly contributes to the persistence of white privilege. After all, if
whites do not see whiteness, they cannot see the privileges associated
with it. But other dynamics join with transparency to create a
reinforcing structure for the perpetuation of white privilege.
MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS
REINFORCE WHITE PRIVILEGE
Both material and socio-cultural factors combine to entrench
white privilege. Material forces rooted in the physical world, such as
the distribution of societal goods and resources, the division of labor,
and immigration policies, create a world that privileges whiteness.
20
Socio-cultural factors, including discursive practices, patterns of
behavior, and the thinking patterns that language creates, further
21
strengthen white privilege, contributing to its endurance.
WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); THOMAS Ross,
JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS (1996); PRIVILEGE REVEALED,
supra note 13; Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603
(1999); McIntosh, supra note 11; Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and
Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy:
Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309 (2000);
Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine
MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993).
20. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego,
and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2280 (2001) (urging
consideration of the material factors that contribute to race and racism, including
socioeconomic competition, immigration pressures, the search for profits, and changes in the
labor pool).
21. Socio-cultural forces may operate indirectly. Political scientist Steven Lukes
articulates mechanisms through which dominant forces maintain political power. STEVEN
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974). Lukes' second dimension of power includes social
values and institutional practices that suppress conflict, keeping "certain interests and issues out
of the political sphere altogether." Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 699, 748. Lukes' third dimension also
involves more subtle mechanisms "that place individuals and communities in circumstances
where they are constrained from clearly asserting their own interests." Id. at 751. This
constraint is accomplished by socializing subordinated groups into "the norms and practices of
the dominant culture. . . . They [subordinated groups] are taught to perceive, remember,
imagine the world as though things cannot-and should not--change." Id. at 751-52. See also
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
[Vol. 18:245
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Commentators have expressed concern about the focus in recent
scholarship on identity politics at the expense of analysis of those
material conditions.22 Yet those material conditions and socio-
cultural patterns of behavior work in tandem to reinforce white
privilege.
Material forces that privilege whiteness permeate society,23 but
remain largely unknown and invisible. A detailed exposition of these
material forces requires book-length treatment, but a few examples
illustrate the scope and power of these material conditions. Scholars
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 109-11 (2002) (discussing Lukes' dimensions of power
and the role of cultural mythology in maintaining domination).
22. See Delgado, supra note 20; Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical
Reading of Iris Young's, JUSTICE AND THIE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, 3 3. OF POL. PHIL. 166
(1995); Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-
Socialist' Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68. But see Iris Marion Young, Unruly Categories: A
Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory, 222 NEW LEFT REV. 147 (Mar./Apr. 1997)
(discussing Nancy Fraser's critique of Young's work for focusing on identity politics and
failing to address the political economy). This article sides with Young in refusing to accept the
dichotomization of culture and economy. Young observes:
From Zapatista challengers to the Mexican government, to Ojibwa defenders of fishing
rights, to African-American leaders demanding that banks invest in their
neighbourhoods, to unions trying to organize a Labor Party, to those sheltering
battered women, resistance has many sites and is often specific to a group without
naming or affirming a group essence. Most of these struggles self-consciously involve
issues of cultural recognition and economic deprivation, but not constituted as
totalizing ends. None of them alone is 'transformative,' but, if linked together, they
can be deeply subversive. Coalition politics can only be built and sustained if each
grouping recognizes and respects the specific perspective and circumstances of the
others ....
Id. at 160.
23. For a breathtaking summary of "the way things are" that privilege maleness, see
CATHARINE A, MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989).
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance
coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and
successful career pattems, their perspectives and concems define quality in
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each
other-their wars and rulerships--defines history, their image defines god, and their
genitals define sex.
Id. Male privilege defines these vital aspects of American culture from a male point of view,
which then becomes the measure for all of society. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at
15. The breadth of male privilege, illustrated by this quotation explaining the manner in which
it defines societal norms, is a useful reference point for beginning to analyze the scope of white
privilege. McIntosh, supra note 11.
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 249 2005
Journal of Law & Policy
have documented the construction of white suburbs, explaining that
federal policy excluded African Americans from the opportunity to
buy housing even as these policies subsidized white buyers.24 The
building ofthe interstate highway system had a "dramatic and lasting
impact on the late twentieth-century urban United States. '' 21 While
the highway project assisted suburban growth, it also decimated
inner-city housing.26 According to Raymond Mohl, "[P]ostwar
policymakers and highway builders used Interstate construction to
destroy low-income and especially black neighborhoods in an effort
to reshape the racial landscapes of the U.S. city., 27 Educational
policies in the United States, from segregation in education 28 to
exclusion from the legal profession,29  have constructed and
reinforced white privilege. The repercussions of these policies
continue today, manifested by the increase of white wealth 30 and
31
well-being.
Socio-cultural factors, such as societal practices and thinking
patterns, including language itself, operate in conjunction with
24. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993);
MELVIN L. OLWER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property
Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1999); Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19; Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About
Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665 (2002).
25. Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The Interstates and Central City Housing, in
FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 226, 226 (John F. Bauman et al, eds., 2000).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996); Bryan K. Fair, Taking
Educational Caste Seriously, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1843 (2004).
29. William C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 547 (2004); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000); Roithmayr, supra note 16.
30. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 24; Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential
Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV.
1199 (2001); Study Says White Families' Wealth Advantage Has Grown, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2004, at A13 (net worth of white households eleven times greater than Latino households and
over fourteen times greater than Black households).
31. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY (2003); LIPSITZ, supra note 19.
250 [Vol. 18:245
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 250 2005
The Persistence of White Privilege
material forces to reinforce white privilege, enabling whites to self-
perpetuate as a dominant racialized identity, albeit a transparent one.
This article focuses on four of these socio-cultural factors: (1) the
contemporary cultural push to colorblindness; (2) the sleight of
mind 32 that typifies the relation between an individual and groups in
American culture; (3) a comfort zone in whiteness, which includes
whiteness as the fabric of daily life for whites and white participation
in the construction of race from a white-privileged viewpoint; and (4)
the tendency for holders of white privilege to "take back the center"
in discourse, turning attention away from potentially uncomfortable
conversations about race toward an emphasis on white concerns and
issues. 33 These dynamics support the persistence of privilege.
THE CONTEMPORARY PUSH TO COLORBLINDNESS
Michael Omi recounts a conversation between Oakland,
California, mayor Jerry Brown34 and two newspaper columnists about
race. 35 The reporters question Brown, asking whether his proposed
redevelopment plan would predominantly benefit whites. Brown
responds that race is "silly" because people have 99 percent the same
DNA. Brown, who is white, acknowledges "a tradition and a history
of racism and disadvantage and oppression," but he asks, "when do
you move on?",
36
32. Sleight of hand is a conjuring trick that requires manual dexterity, whereas the
individual-group dynamic, see infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text, is a mental trick. The
phrase "sleight of mind" better captures the mental process that weaves between individuals and
groups, occurring unnoticed. Thank you to Patricia Leary for suggesting this phrase.
33. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 90-93, for a discussion of "taking back
the center," explaining how the use of analogies in reasoning and conversation fuels that sense
of entitlement.
34. Edmund G. ("Jerry") Brown Jr. served as governor of California for eight years
beginning in 1975. "He appointed an extraordinary number of women and minorities to high
government positions, including the first woman, African-American and Latino to the
California Supreme Court." Jerry Brown, at http://oaklandnet.com/govemment/mayor/
biography.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005). In 1998, he was elected mayor of Oakland. Id.
35. Michael Omi, Rethinking the Language of Race and Racism, 8 ASIAN L.J. 161, 161-
62 (2001).
36. Id. at 161-62 (quoting Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, Long March, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
10, 2000, at A 17). Here is Omi's description of the conversation and its context:
2005]
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Omi recounts this story as emblematic of a new racial "common
sense," based on the premise that race is unimportant as a social
category, because it lacks any biological basis. 37 This racial "common
sense" further assumes that the time has come to move beyond race
and to emphasize colorblindness. 38  Brown typifies the politician
trying to be on the cutting edge of contemporary thought by tapping
into an attitude that has intellectual currency. He is striving to
demonstrate that he is "in vogue." Unfortunately, behind the style
points lies a serious wrongheadedness. Critiquing this colorblind
view as failing to see racial inequality as structured, Omi urges
particular attention to the use of terms like "race" and "racism." 39 The
idea of colorblindness pushes any discussion toward a narrow view of
discrimination, privilege, and subordination. It promotes an attitude
that since society should not notice race, "we don't have a problem"
anymore.4 °
In January of 2000, Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown was asked by San Francisco
Chronicle political columnists Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross about his downtown
revitalization plans.
The following dialogue ensued:
Matier & Ross: Some people say you're just trying to bring 10,000 white people into
the downtown with all these high-priced live-work lofts.
Brown: How do you know what color they are going to be?
Matier & Ross: Come on, who do you think lives in these lofts?
Brown: Well, that's kind of a stigmatization of nonwhite people. There are African
Americans, Chinese, Filipinos and there are white people-and by the way, race is just
kind of silly anyway because 99 percent of our DNA is the same.
Matier & Ross: Maybe, but race is still a part of politics--especially local politics.
Brown: It's a fact that is often manipulated and used. Yes, there is a tradition and a
history of racism and disadvantage and oppression. But having said all that, when do
you move on? And when do you try and pull it all together?
Id.
37. Id. at 162.
38. Id. Omi comments, "Any hints of race consciousness are now suspiciously viewed as
racist and impermissible in a good, just, and supposedly color-blind society." Id. at 163.
39. Id. at 163. His essay concludes by discussing racial classification, the notion of racism
as hate, and conflicts between communities of color. Id. at 163-67.
40. For additional critiques of the notion of colorblind-ness, see BRoWN ET AL., supra note
31; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE (1997); Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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INDIVIDUAL-GROUPS SLEIGHT OF MIND4
Descartes' famous quote, "I think therefore I am" epitomizes the
individuality of Western liberal ideology.42 The individual is the
center of that world. David Wilkins, reflecting on his visit to
aboriginal peoples in Australia, suggests "I experience therefore I
am" as a phrase more descriptive of the constitutive process that
humans undergo in reacting to and learning from each other and the
world around them.4 3 "1 experience therefore I am" portrays the
relational nature of individuals, who do not become who they are in
isolation from each other or solely within the confines of the thinking
brain.
Understanding the persistence of privilege requires recognizing
the sleight of mind that occurs on the subject of individuals as
members of groups. 44 We are each individuals, assured of individual
rights. But sometimes we are group members, acting relationally.
Understanding privilege requires conceptualizing individuals as part
of groups.4a As john powell explains, "our personal relationships are
mediated through power and institutional structures; privilege cannot
be addressed at only the personal level.",4 6 Considering only the
personal, individual holder of the knapsack of privilege results in
missing a significant part of how privilege operates. The systemic,
group aspect of privilege fortifies and maintains the societal
advantage it bestows. The group "white" and individuals within it
benefit from the normalization of these advantages in the material
41. See supra note 32 (explaining this phrase).
42. See ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-
STATE 110 (1999) (musing about Descartes' phrase in relation to affirmative action).
43. David E. Wilkins, Keynote Address: A Constitutional Confession, 37 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 473,475 (2003).
44. See john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial
Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 422 (2000); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender, and
the Fourteenth Amendment: Reclaiming Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 709 (2004) (describing clash between individuals and groups in equal protection
jurisprudence).
45. powell, supra note 44, at 449 (criticizing court decisions that "decontextualiz[e]
people and groups of people, portraying them as self-created individuals who live outside of
any social, historical, or political context"). See also Wildman, supra note 44.
46. powell, supra note 44, at 444 (citing IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE (1990)).
2005]
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conditions of society. So, for example, "white" neighborhoods
feature good schools, transportation, and commercial services that
make it easier to negotiate life's daily chores.
This failure to engage the individual-group dynamic in relation to
the notion of equality, generally, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in
particular, has strengthened the likelihood that white privilege will
flourish. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment does use the
word "person"; it says: "No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 47 This language
indicates the primacy of equal protection to individuals.
But the Supreme Court's development of equal protection
jurisprudence, while seeking to retain that primacy, has
ignored the relationship of that individual person to the
significant identity groups in which that individual might be a
member. This failure to recognize the individual-group
interrelation has resulted in a jurisprudence that makes no
sense. It has created a body of decisional law resulting in
whites suing with impunity as their charge of race
discrimination finds ready remedy. Yet people of color
claiming race discrimination, in a society that systemically
privileges whiteness, find their pleas unheard.48
Challenges to material conditions that facilitate the persistence of
white privilege fail when legal analysis focuses solely on individuals
and ignores group advantage.
The ability to choose whether to focus on ourselves as individuals
or as group members reinforces white privilege. Antidiscrimination
laws, like Title VII, do recognize group membership, prohibiting
discrimination against an individual because of that group
identification. But the focus in antidiscrimination doctrine upon
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy, supra note 19; Wildman, supra note 44, at 711-12;
see also Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative
Action, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1089 (2002) (suggesting viewing equal protection in terms of group
status and competition).
[Vol. 18:245
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individuals makes subordination and discrimination seem like
anecdotal problems, veiling their systemic nature.49
COMFORT ZONE IN WHITENESS
Charles Lawrence described the existence of this comfort zone in
whiteness from the position of an outsider, viewing it in a dream he
had.50 In the dream two white colleagues are discussing his teaching
future. Even though he is present, he is not visible to them; they
speak as though he were not there.51 The two white colleagues create
a community, sharing a comfort level in their interaction that is
evident to him, even though they seem to be unaware of it as they
converse.
Martha Mahoney illustrates the manner in which this phenomenon
operates from a white perspective in the context of residential
segregation:
[W]hen you wake up in the morning and go to the kitchen for
coffee, you do not feel as if you hold partial interests or
particular sticks in a bundle of rights in the structure you
inhabit, nor does it feel as if land-use regulation shaped your
structure, street, and community. This is home, where you roll
out of bed, smell the coffee, reach for clothing, and inhabit the
"reality" of the house. The physicality of home and community
... tends to make our lived experience appear natural.52
The white person's lived experience, the fabric of daily life,
emphasizes-and minute to minute recreates-the whiteness of the
world. This whiteness is just normal-"the way things are."5 3 But as
49. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13 at 25-41, for further discussion of
antidiscrimination law, especially in the workplace context.
50. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2231 (1992).
51. Id.at2231-32.
52. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19, at 1661-62.
53. Id. at 1662. John 0. Calmore emphasizes the segregation that created this white world:
"[I1t is difficult for whites to appreciate the dehumanizing constraints and isolation of imposed
segregation .... The compoundedness of race and space ... for whites [is] taken for granted;
white space is not problematic and black space is somewhere else." John 0. Calmore,
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of
Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1995).
2005)
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Mahoney explains, "the way things are ... tends to make prevailing
patterns of race, ethnicity, power, and the distribution of privilege
appear as features of the natural world.' 54 The maintenance of
whiteness, the re-creation of that community, remains unseen.
Mahoney's illustration of the white person waking up and
smelling the coffee serves as an important reminder of the role we
each play in constructing race from the world around us. Amy
Kastely further elaborates on white participation in racial
construction, using the example of Toni Morrison's story Recitatif 55
As Kastely explains:
Recitatif draws attention to ways that race functions for
informative purposes in contemporary written texts, as readers
give significance to racial identification in matters of character,
situation, and narrative movement and as they unconsciously
or uncritically locate themselves in relation to race
consciousness in the text.
56
In Recitatif, Morrison never identifies the characters' races. Where
racial ambiguity exists, the human mind makes its own assumptions,
based on cues, categories, and stereotypes. 57 The fabric of daily life
for most whites, coupled with colorblindness and a focus on the
individual, tilts white participation in the construction of race toward
utilizing cues, categories, and stereotypes that maintain the privileged
comfort zone.
TAKING BACK THE CENTER
I
Meetings, colloquies, and classrooms usually convene with an
agenda that defines the purpose or center of discourse. White
54. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19, at 1661-62.
55. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); see
also Toni Morrison, Recitatif in CONFIRMATION 243-61 (Amiri Baraka & Amina Baraka eds.,
1983).
56. Kastely, supra note 55, at 270-71.
57. Id. at 271 ("Recitatifinvites readers to pay attention to the complex arrangements of
raced and gendered tropes and codes that are, or are expected to be, quite clear to contemporary
readers and to look closely at the construction of race we bring or perform as readers.").
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privilege has promoted a white sense of entitlement to place white
concerns at the center of most agendas.58
Members of dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the
pertinent perceptions, that their problems are the problems that
need to be addressed, and that in discourse they should be the
speaker rather than the listener....
So strong is this expectation of holding center stage that even
when a time and place are specifically designated for members of
a nonprivileged group to be central, members of the dominant
group will often attempt to take back the pivotal focus. They are
stealing the center-usually with a complete lack of self-
consciousness.
9
This dominant white perspective, monopolizing the center of
discourse, manifests itself in judicial form, when legal analysis takes
the focus away from outrageous injustice. Decisions that parse an
unjust situation to show how it differs from other cases that have
found injustice resonate as a form of "taking back the center."
Minimizing or rejecting claims of racial injustice reinforces a white
comfort zone.
PRIVILEGE AND LAW
Audiences at presentations and lectures about privilege frequently
ask, "What does privilege have to do with law?" The fact that any
analysis of privilege has been omitted historically from legal
reasoning does not mean it could not be a useful lens, perhaps more
useful than discrimination, for viewing fact patterns. The socio-
cultural factors, discursive practices, patterns of behavior, and
thinking patterns created by language have resulted in an absence of
an awareness of privilege in legal arguments. Courts' failure to
58. One recent, well-publicized example of the battle to control the education agenda has
been dubbed the "culture wars" that arose with introduction of non-white-centered history and
literature on college campuses. See, e.g., HENRY L. GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE
CULTURE WARS (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA
Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995).
59. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 91.
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recognize the privileging dynamic and to include it in legal analysis
further perpetuates that privilege.
Court decisions have recognized privilege without naming it as
such. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter,60 one of the legal building
blocks that led to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,61
Thurgood Marshall and the lawyers who worked with him tackled
inequality and segregation in legal education. Heman Marion Sweatt,
who was African American, applied for admission to the University
of Texas Law School. The school denied his application because it
admitted only white students.62 The Court acknowledged the potential
argument that no denial of equal protection had occurred because,
just as Texas excluded African-American students from the
University of Texas, it excluded white students from the School of
Law of the Texas State University for Negroes, a black law school
created in response to the litigation.63 In Sweatt, the Court stepped out
of the traditional legal liberalism, "equal treatment" paradigm. 64 The
Court rejected the argument that excluding whites from an all black
school paralleled excluding blacks from a white school. Rather the
Court said that argument "overlook[ed] realities." 65 In Sweatt, the
Court identified tangible and intangible factors that were important to
a quality education, factors that related to privilege. 66 Although the
60. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631 (at the time of the original lawsuit "there was no law school in
Texas which admitted Negroes"). For biographic information on Heman Sweatt, see The
Handbook of Texas Online, at http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/SS/
fsw23.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2005).
63. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
64. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 170-71 for a discussion of legal
liberalism.
65. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
66. The Court stated:
[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white
and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of
courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law
School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name
but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is
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Court did not use the term privilege, it recognized its existence in the
form of tangible factors, like faculty, courses, and library, and
intangible factors such as faculty reputation, administration
experience, alumni influence, school tradition, and prestige. That
recognition of privilege has been largely absent in post-Brown
jurisprudence. 67
The absence of a privilege analysis in law can result in the
perpetuation of injustice, as occurred in the case based on the
following facts. In March 1995, Denise Arguello and her family,
including her father Alberto Govea, stopped to purchase gas at a
Conoco gas station in Fort Worth, Texas.68 After her husband
pumped the gas, Ms. Arguello and her father entered the station's
convenience store to pay for the gas and to purchase beer. They
waited in line while Cindy Smith, a clerk, helped other customers.
Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith summarizes the testimony about
what happened next:
Arguello testified that Smith was rude to her when she reached
the counter and that her demeanor was less friendly than it had
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would
consider the question close.
Id. at 633-34.
67. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy
of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 247 (2000) (describing the dismantling of civil rights precedent); see also id. at
974 (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 overturned aspects of American culture that
had resulted in white privilege); cf Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using
the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997) (urging a legislative rather than
judicial focus for social change); see also id. at 974 (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of
1964 overturned aspects of American culture that had resulted in white privilege).
68. Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 2003). The absence of outrage
surrounding this decision suggests it is unremarkable, part of "the way things are." A few
exceptions, expressing a sense of injury from the case include Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing
Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
989 (2004) and Allison McJunkin, Casenote, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 163
(2004); see also Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003) (citing facts of
Arguello in notes).
Several surveys of franchise law do mention the case, see, e.g., Deborah S. Coldwell et al.,
Franchise Law, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1055, 1076 (2000); William L. Killion, Ellen R. Lokker, &
Anne-Marie Gauthier, 2001 Franchising Currents, 20 WTR FRANCHISE L.J. 150, 152 (2001);
see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1099, 1101 (2002) (citing Arguello as supporting the need for liability for trademark owners).
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been with the customers she had previously served. After
Arguello presented her credit card as payment, Smith
requested identification. Arguello testified that Smith singled
her out by demanding that she provide identification; Smith
contends that she requested identification because Arguello
was attempting to buy beer.
Arguello, an Oklahoma resident, presented Smith with her
valid Oklahoma driver's license. Smith initially refused to
accept it, claiming she could not take an out-of-state license,
but she eventually accepted it and completed the transaction.
During Arguello's purchase, Govea became increasingly
frustrated with the manner in which Smith was treating his
daughter. Consequently, he left the beer he had intended to
purchase on the counter and walked out of the store.
After Smith completed Arguello's sale, the tension between
them escalated into a confrontation. Arguello testified that
Smith began shouting obscenities at her and making racially
derogatory remarks. [According to the trial court memorandum
opinion Arguello alleged that "Smith referred to her as a 'f* *
*ing [sic] Iranian Mexican bitch."'' 69] Arguello began to leave
with her purchase, but realized that she had the wrong copy of
the credit card slip and approached the counter again. After
another argument, Arguello and Smith exchanged copies. As
Arguello walked away the second time, Smith shoved a six-
pack of beer off the counter and onto the floor.
Plaintiffs testified that after Arguello left the store, Smith
began screaming racist remarks over the intercom. At the same
time, Smith laughed at Arguello and her family and made
several crude gestures. Govea and other family members
telephoned Conoco from a payphone outside the store to lodge
a complaint. During that telephone conversation, the Conoco
official indicated that he wanted to know the name of the clerk
in question. When Govea attempted to re-enter the store to
69. 2001 WL 1442340, No. CIV.A. 397CV0638-H, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9,2001).
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determine Smith's name, Smith locked him out while laughing
and making crude gestures.70
Arguello and Govea sued claiming race discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981. A jury decided the case in their favor, but the
district court granted Conoco's motion for a judgment as a matter of
law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling in favor of
Conoco.71
The Fifth Circuit began its decision by reviewing the elements of
a § 1981 claim:
[A] plaintiff must establish "(1) that she is a member of a racial
minority; (2) that [the defendant] had intent to discriminate on
the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one
or more of the activities enumerated in the statute. 72
The court acknowledged no dispute existed over plaintiffs' status as
racial minorities73 and that the evidence had been sufficient to create
a jury question as to whether they had suffered discrimination during
their visit to defendant's store. 74 The court stated: "this case turns on
the third element, namely, whether Smith's conduct implicated rights
guaranteed by § 1981 .
Fifth Circuit law for establishing a denial of § 1981 rights in the
retail setting requires evidence of an attempt to contract that was
thwarted by the defendant merchant. The purchase must be thwarted,
not merely deterred by the merchant.76 The Fifth Circuit stated that
because Govea voluntarily left the beer on the counter and exited the
70. 330 F.3d at 356-57.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Id. at 358.
73. "The first element is not disputed-all parties concede that Arguello and Govea are
Hispanic." Id.
74.
[T]he testimonial and other evidence provides a basis for concluding that Smith
subjected Arguello to substandard service. In conjunction with that evidence of
maltreatment, the testimony regarding the racially charged nature of Smith's
comments sufficed to create a jury question regarding whether Smith intentionally
discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis of race.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 359.
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store without trying to buy it, the clerk Smith did not prevent Govea
from making the purchase.77 The court similarly found Arguello
without remedy because she did "successfully complete the
,,78transaction.
Plaintiffs had argued for a broader interpretation of the statute that
included "the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship. '79 The court declined to
follow this proposed broader application. Rather, it distinguished case
law involving both discriminatory service in restaurants and clubs
80
and other cases concerning discriminatory prepayment or check-
writing policies.
8 1
The lack of outrage surrounding the result illustrates another way
that privilege operates. The decision does not merely reflect the view
of an aberrational circuit court ignored by the Supreme Court in its
denial of certiorari; the case also becomes precedent, setting the
terms for appropriate future behavior. How will the general counsel
of Conoco advise employees to act in the future?82 What advice
might corporate counsel have given to employees if the result had
come out differently? This decision permits subordination and abuse
to continue without redress or even acknowledgment that it was
wrong. That continuation reinscribes the white privilege that made
the conduct and ensuing judicial decision possible. White privilege
enabled the judges to cast Mr. Govea's transaction as a voluntary
withdrawal from purchasing beer. Most likely, the judges had been to
convenience stores much like this one, but they probably had not
been welcomed with racial epithets.83 Life lived in the white comfort
zone made it easy for judges to miss the injustice. The judges likely
experienced their own convenience store visits as individuals. As
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).
80. Id. at 360-61.
81. Id. at 361.
82. Thank you to Martha Mahoney for offering this insightful question.
83. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 1009 ("[W]hite judges may lack the experiences to be able
to recognize the legal harms articulated in a consumer discrimination complaint.... [I]t is very
likely that these are the same stores in which white upper-class males (like judges) shop without
incident.").
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individuals they were unable to see the group identification that
represents the lived reality for non-whites. That reality means not
only facing this kind of harassment but also never knowing when it
will strike as one goes about the business of life.84 That fear of a
world gone awry, like a rug pulled from under one's feet, has not
been part of the white comfort zone. The push to colorblindness
further supports law operating within these cultural practices to
ignore the racialized reality in which the transaction took place. The
judicial form of "taking back the center" maintains the status quo that
led to the injustice.
Until law and the legal system address scenarios like that faced by
Ms. Arguello and Mr. Govea, subordinating practices will continue.
This case suggests the limits of antidiscrimination law, which does
seem fairly useless if its scope cannot comprehend the injustice
apparent in this situation.85 Reflecting on the inexplicable unfairness
of key judicial decisions, Jerome Culp asked:
How do you defend the tests in Washington v. Davis, the
decision in Bowers, or the rule in Korematsu, the failure to
apply prior principles in McCleskey, or the reasoning in Shaw
v. Reno?
86
He answers his question, "The court ultimately simply responds that
we the white majority have the power to do what we want in these
cases." 87 He reminds us that white judges, who do not face the same
risk in making contracts as the Arguello family, have the power,
reinforced by white privilege, to ignore the non-privileged reality.
This failure to recognize privilege results in injustice like the
Arguello case.
84. This family did not have same security a white family would have when traveling by
car and stopping to purchase gas. See, e.g., PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 168-69
(following the eviction of two families, one white and one African-American, the African-
American family has fewer options when seeking new housing than the white counterpart).
85. Wildman, supra note 44, at 711-12.
86. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1637, 1669 (1999).
87. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Catharine Wells explains that judging is "an inherently situated
activity. 88 According to Wells, a judge "cannot escape the effects of
his or her own particular situation" in performing the task of
judging. 89 Wells relates Justice Benjamin Cardozo's illuminating
delineation of the situated nature of judging:
There is in each of us a stream of tendency ... which gives
coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot
escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives,
forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have
been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs,
acquired convictions . . . .In this mental background every
problem finds its settings. We may try to see things as
objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them
with any eyes except our own.
90
Wells argues that if judging is situated, judges must pay attention to
their situation.91 But it is not only judges, but all of us with white
privilege, whether we are decision makers, part of decision-making
bodies, or comfortable individuals, who need to pay more attention.
Paying attention means becoming more self-conscious about the
ways "personal history, character, and outlook" impact the decisions
and interactions with which we engage the world.92 Reaching that
self-consciousness is more difficult from within the white comfort
zone that emphasizes colorblindness and individualism. Combating
the persistence of privilege requires self-consciousness about these
socio-cultural patterns and the material conditions that maintain the
88. Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on
the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323, 323 (1992); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial
Diversity on the Bench, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000) (explaining that minority judges
could enrich judicial decisionmaking as representatives of outsider perspectives); Catharine
Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990) (discussing contextual
decisionmaking).
89. Wells, Improving One's Situation, supra note 88, at 324.
90. Id. at 323 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF T14E JUDICIAL PROCESS
12-13 (1921)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 324.
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white privilege reality. Self-consciousness can be the first step toward
action.
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